International trade costs are of vital importance because they determine trade patterns and therefore economic performance. This paper develops a new micro-founded measure of international trade costs. It is based on a multicountry general equilibrium model of trade that incorporates bilateral "iceberg" trade costs. The model results in a gravity equation from which the implied trade costs can be easily computed. The trade cost measure is intuitive, takes multilateral resistance into account and yields empirical results that are economically sensible. It is found that during the post-World War II period trade costs have declined markedly. The dispersion of trade costs across countries can best be explained by geographical and historical factors like distance and colonial linkages but also by tari¤s and free trade agreements.
Introduction
Barriers to international trade are large and since they impede trade ‡ows, they have a strong impact on countries' overall economic performance and welfare. Some barriers, like tari¤s and transportation costs, are directly observable but numerous other barriers are notoriously di¢ cult to measure, for example administrative and communication costs.
The aim of this paper is to derive a comprehensive measure of trade costs that can capture all barriers to international trade.
This comprehensive measure of trade barriers is derived by incorporating bilateral "iceberg" trade costs into a multi-country general equilibrium model of trade. Iceberg trade costs mean that for each good that is exported a certain fraction melts away during the trading process as if an iceberg were shipped across the ocean. The model yields a simple micro-founded gravity equation from which the implied international trade costs can be inferred. This indirect approach results in a comprehensive measure of trade barriers that is both intuitive and easy to compute. Apart from providing snapshots of trade costs over time, the paper also seeks to explain the dispersion of trade costs across country pairs. The most important determinants of trade costs are found to be geographical factors like distance and being landlocked as well as historical linkages such as a common colonial history and the use of a common language.
In particular, sharing a common colonial history on average cuts the tari¤ equivalent of trade costs by 16 percentage points and using a common language reduces trade barriers by 10 percentage points. Both these e¤ects have diminished over time, however, as the impact of colonial history has subsided and as the learning of foreign languages has become more widespread. Perhaps more surprisingly, institutional factors like tari¤s and nominal exchange rate volatility play a smaller role in explaining the dispersion of trade costs.
Trade costs have recently attracted wide attention in the literature. James Anderson and Eric van Wincoop (2004) present an in-depth survey of trade costs and argue that the representative tari¤ equivalent of international trade costs is around 74 percent, which is consistent with the range found in the present paper. David Hummels (2001) measures some components of trade costs directly such as transportation costs. His measures, however, are usually speci…c to particular goods or transportation modes and therefore not necessarily representative of overall trade costs in an economy.
The traditional way of accounting for trade costs is by ex ante assuming trade costs to consist of certain components and then including these components into a gravity equation. Two well-known applications of this strand are John McCallum's (1995) and Andrew Rose's (2000) papers. McCallum (1995) examines the e¤ect of the U.S.-Canadian border as a very general form of a trade costs, whereas Rose (2000) focuses on common currencies. However, as pointed out by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , such atheoretical inclusion of trade cost components can lead to an omitted variable bias and therefore invalid comparative statics. In contrast, this paper follows a di¤erent approach by measuring trade costs indirectly and comprehensively through inference from aggregate trade ‡ows on the basis of a theoretically derived gravity equation. In this two-step procedure a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade costs is computed …rst and then the trade cost components are identi…ed ex post.
Scott Baier and Je¤rey Bergstrand (2001) also derive a gravity equation that includes trade costs but they restrict trade costs to transportation costs and tari¤s and do not consider other geographical, historical or institutional determinants. More recently, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) introduce a micro-founded gravity equation with trade costs based on a general equilibrium framework that is conditional on a certain allocation of production and consumption. The drawback of this framework is that it does not allow for valid comparative statics. For example, a change in trade barriers will not only have an e¤ect on trade ‡ows but also on the allocation of production and consumption within countries. To account for such e¤ects I develop a general equilibrium framework in which the allocation of production and consumption is determined endogenously.
In addition, the gravity equations developed by Baier and Bergstrand (2001) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) include price indices that are unobservable because they are theoretical constructs. But the gravity equation I derive in the present paper is more practical since it consists of observable variables only and therefore provides an easy and intuitive way of computing trade costs.
The results on the factors that drive the dispersion of trade costs are generally consistent with previous …ndings in the literature, which is surveyed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) . For example, the language barrier estimates by Hummels (2001) and Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum (2002) lie in the same range as mine. Similar to my results, Je¤rey Frankel and Andrew Rose (2002) …nd evidence that a common colonial history signi…cantly facilitates trade. Furthermore, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) point out that nowadays most developed countries have low tari¤s and that tari¤s therefore only represent a small fraction of overall trade costs. This observation is re ‡ected in my …nding that tari¤s only play a minor role in explaining the dispersion of trade costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the general equilibrium model with iceberg trade costs, resulting in the essential gravity equation. Section 3 presents the historical evolution of trade costs with special emphasis on the G7 and European Union countries, showing that economic integration has progressed fastest on a regional level.
Section 4 identi…es the factors that determine trade costs and provides a discussion of the results, also comparing them to evidence from the late 19th century trade boom. Section 5 concludes.
A Model with Iceberg Trade Costs
This section develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model that is similar to the framework typically encountered in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature, as for example in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) , with the exception that the model abstracts from price stickiness as it does not focus on the short run. The model augments the standard framework in three distinct ways. First, it extends it to multiple countries. Second, it adds nontradable goods and third, as its central ingredient the model incorporates iceberg trade costs of the kind introduced by Samuelson (1954) and …rst included in a monopolistic competition model by Krugman (1980) . Optimizing consumers and …rms inhabit J countries with j = 1; 2;:::; J and J 2.
The range of all consumers and of all goods produced in the world is the continuum [0; 1].
Country j comprises the consumer range [n j 1 ; n j ] and country-j monopolistic …rms each produce one di¤erentiated good on the same range, where n 0 = 0 and n J = 1. It is assumed that the exogenous fraction s j of goods is tradable so that [n j 1 ; n j 1 + s j (n j n j 1 )]
is the range of all tradable goods produced by country j (0 < s j 1). 1 These can be purchased by all consumers in the world. The remaining range [n j 1 + s j (n j n j 1 ); n j ] represents country j's nontradable goods. The latter are available for purchase to countryj consumers only.
Exogenous bilateral "iceberg" trade costs j;k are incurred when goods are shipped from country j to country k where
Iceberg trade costs mean that for each unit of goods that is shipped from j to k the fraction j;k melts away as if an iceberg were shipped across the ocean ( j;k < 1 for j 6 = k). Note that bilateral trade costs can be asymmetric such that j;k 6 = k;j . The assumption of zero intranational trade costs is a normalization which can also be found in Baier and Bergstrand (2001) . 1 For an empirical motivation of this assumption see Section 2.4.
Consumers
All consumers within one country are identical. They like consumption and dislike work such that their utility can be described as
where C j and L j denote per-capita consumption and labor input in country j. The parameter is assumed to be identical across countries. C j is a CES composite consumption index de…ned as
where c ji denotes the per-capita consumption of good i in country j. The country-j consumption index (2) is de…ned over all tradable goods produced in the world, which is the left term within the brackets of (2), plus all nontradable goods produced by country j, which are given by the right term within the brackets. The parameter > 1 is the elasticity of substitution and it is assumed to be identical across countries.
The consumption-based price index is de…ned as the minimum expenditure for one unit of C j and can be derived from (2) as
where ji denotes the prices of the individual goods as follows
p T ki denotes the f.o.b. (free on board) price of the tradable good produced by country-k …rm i and p T ki =(1 k;j ) is the c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) price of the same good when traded with country j. p N T ji is the price of the nontradable good produced by country-j …rm i. All prices are denominated in one world currency.
The c.i.f. price is 1=(1 k;j ) times the f.o.b. price because when one unit of a tradable good produced by a country-k …rm is shipped to country j, only the fraction (1 k;j ) arrives at the destination. The tari¤ equivalent k;j of iceberg trade costs can be expressed
Maximizing consumption (2) subject to the minimum expenditure (3) yields the indi-vidual demand function
Finally, the per-capita budget constraint in country j is given by
where W j is the nominal wage and j denotes per-capita nominal pro…ts made by country-j …rms, which are fully redistributed to country-j consumers.
Firms
There is monopolistic competition such that each …rm is the single producer of one di¤er-entiated good and sets the pro…t-maximizing price. Not all …rms within one country are symmetric since in country j the fraction s j of …rms produces tradable goods, whereas the fraction (1 s j ) produces nontradable goods. Let y T ji denote the output produced by country-j tradable …rm i and y N T ji the output produced by country-j nontradable …rm i. In addition, let y T ji;k be the tradable output of …rm i produced for country k so that
All …rms face a linear production function that has constant returns to scale and that operates with labor as the only input
where A j is an exogenous and country-speci…c technology level that is assumed to be the same across the tradable and nontradable sectors. L T ji;k and L N T ji denote the amount of labor used to produce y T ji;k and y N T ji with
Note that since all consumers within one country are identical, they each spread their labor over all domestic …rms according to how much labor input each …rm needs. Since labor is assumed to be internationally immobile, domestic consumers do not work for foreign …rms.
With clearing markets it follows from demand function (6) for the tradable good pro-duced by country-j …rm i
The right-hand side of (12) represents the amount of the tradable good i that the (n k n k 1 ) consumers in country k demand. The left-hand side is the amount of the same good that arrives in country k after being shipped there from country j. Accordingly, it follows for a country-j nontradable good
The pro…t function for tradable …rm i in country j is
where W j is the nominal wage that is assumed to be same in the tradable and nontradable sectors. Plugging the production function (9) and the market-clearing condition (12) into (14) and maximizing with respect to p T ji yields
For nontradable …rms the same procedure leads to
so that
Thus, all country-j …rms set the same price p j , irrespective of whether they produce tradable or nontradable goods.
A Gravity Equation with Trade Costs
Appendix A.1 shows that the model outlined above has a unique equilibrium solution. As one might expect, in equilibrium trade costs reduce the real wage, consumption and real
Since all country-j …rms producing tradable goods are symmetric and since s j (n j 2 See equations (31)- (33) and (37) in Appendix A.1.
n j 1 ) is the overall number of these …rms, all goods that leave country j for destination country k are given by
where EXP j;k denotes real exports from j to k. Appendix A.2 shows that by using market-clearing condition (12) and plugging in the equilibrium solutions for prices and consumption, one can derive a micro-founded gravity equation that incorporates trade costs
where GDP j is real output of country j and EXP j P k6 =j EXP j;k are total real exports from j. and (GDP k EXP k ). These terms can be interpreted as 'market potential'terms in the sense that (GDP j EXP j ) is country-j output which is potentially tradable but not yet traded. For example, if GDP j increases with total exports EXP j and everything else constant, then the market potential and thus bilateral trade will increase. Vice versa, if total exports EXP j increase with GDP j and everything else constant, then market potential and thus bilateral trade will drop. The reason is the general equilibrium e¤ect that in order for an increase in EXP j to occur, trade costs with third countries must have dropped, for instance j;l with l 6 = k, making trade between j and k relatively more costly.
Market potential takes trade into account that is conducted with third countries and that will not be diverted to country k for given trade costs.
Gravity equation (19) Another advantage of gravity equation (19) is that it allows for an easy computation of the bilateral trade costs that are implied by observable trade ‡ows. In order to identify trade costs, it is assumed that bilateral trade costs are symmetric ( j;k = k;j ), an assumption which is standard in the literature, for instance in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . It is also assumed that the fraction of …rms producing tradable goods is the same across countries (s j = s k = s). 3 Gravity equation (19) can then be rewritten as Given the equilibrium solution of the model, a micro-founded single gravity equation
with EXP j;k as the only dependent trade ‡ow variable can be derived as
where P OP j is the population of country j. As a special feature of gravity equation (21), the relative population of country k is a determinant of exports from j to k. Intuitively, the 3 See Section 2.4 for a discussion of s. 4 Head and Ries (2001) compute a U.S.-Canadian border e¤ect based on relative expenditure ratios but their two-country framework does not consider trade with partners outside North America and thus does not capture multilateral resistance. It does not allow for nontradable goods either. Head and Mayer (2004) derive a measure of "accessibility" of a market or "trade freeness" in the context of the New Economic Geography literature. Their measure is similar to the trade cost function (20) but it applies to speci…c industries only, whereas (20) holds at a higher level of aggregation. Their measure does not take into account nontradable goods and it is based on exogenous expenditure shares as opposed to general equilibrium. Furthermore, the trade cost measure derived in the current paper allows for trade cost asymmetries and trade imbalances (see equations (22) and (23) and Appendix A.3). In addition, the current paper emphasizes the evolution of empirical trade costs over time and their determinants (see Sections 3 and 4).
5 Appendix A.3 also demonstrates how to derive a gravity equation that includes imports.
more people inhabit country k, the more imports they demand from country j. 6 Anderson (1979) points out that although most theoretical models do not lead to gravity equations that include population, in empirical applications population is nevertheless frequently used as a regressor and usually found to be signi…cant. The present model provides a theoretical underpinning.
The single gravity equation for EXP k;j is like equation (21) but with the j-and kindices swapped. Given the two single gravity equations it becomes possible to solve for trade costs as
Equations (22) and (23) illustrate that bilateral trade costs between two countries can di¤er depending on the direction of trade. For example, imagine that initially all righthand side variables in (22) and (23) are symmetric (EXP j;k = EXP k;j , P OP j = P OP k etc.) It follows j;k = k;j . Then suppose that all else being equal country k's market potential (GDP k EXP k ) increases, leading to j;k > k;j . Intuitively, if country k absorbs more goods domestically without simultaneously demanding more goods from j, then trade costs from j to k must have gone up.
But computing empirical trade costs on the basis of (22) and (23) 
Data and Parameter Assumptions
Trade costs are computed on the basis of equation (20 If an additional country-k consumer is born, the marginal utility she derives from her …rst unit of a country-j good will be higher than for an existing country-j consumer, resulting in an increase in EXP j;k .
7 Appendix A.3 explains the inconsistency problems that arise when trade ‡ow data are reported by di¤erent countries. See Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) for a discussion. 8 The OECD countries include all current 30 OECD countries exclusive of Belgium/Luxembourg and the Czech Republic/Slovak Republic who only report jointly. Poland, Portugal and Turkey are not included most countries only more recent data are reported. The data appendix provides details.
Computing bilateral trade costs on the basis of gravity equation (20) requires two parameter assumptions. The …rst is = 11 for the elasticity of substitution, which via the optimal prices (15) and (16) corresponds to a markup of 10 percent. The elasticity of substitution is typically estimated to lie near 7 or 8 but many studies …nd higher values. 9 For example, under the assumption of homogeneity across industries Head and Ries (2001) obtain an estimate of 11:4 for the elasticity of substitution. Eaton and Kortum (2002) estimate to be 9:28.
Intuitively, a lower means that consumers are less sensitive to prices and trade costs. They should therefore be expected to trade more. To reconcile the lower price elasticity with observed trade ‡ows, a lower tends to shift the level of trade costs upwards. The second assumed parameter is the fraction s of the range of …rms that produce tradable goods. Stockman and Tesar (1990) say that this fraction is "di¢ cult to estimate directly from the data"but report evidence that the expenditure on nontradable goods as a share of private …nal consumption ranges from 18:9 to 44:3 percent for …ve large OECD countries (France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States) between 1960 and 1988. As my sample includes many smaller countries, the appropriate share of nontradable goods is likely to be closer to the lower end of this range. I therefore choose s = 0:8, implying that the fraction of the range of goods that are nontradable is 20 percent across all economies.
Given the general decrease in trade costs over the last decades, one might expect that more goods have become tradable, as suggested in the literature on endogenous tradability, for instance by Bergin and Glick (2006) . However, the IMF …nds in a recent empirical analysis of globalization that based on sectoral input-output tables "unlike in many emerging market countries, the tradables sector share output in most industrial countries has actually fallen slightly in recent years because of the rapid expansion of (20) and then converted into the tari¤ equivalent through (5).
Bilateral Trade Costs in the U.S. and UK
This subsection scrutinizes bilateral trade costs for the United States and for the United Kingdom as two eminent examples. The UK is picked as the second biggest European economy after Germany whose data show a structural break in the wake of reuni…cation. Table 1 The increases seem less staggering if one takes into account that the initial 1960 tari¤ equivalents for these countries are comparatively low. What the U.S. and the UK have in common is that except for Korea the most dramatic declines in trade costs have occurred with nearby countries, in this case France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain.
These countries also exhibit the lowest levels of trade costs. 
The G7 and European Union Countries
Bilateral trade costs are computed amongst the G7 countries between 1960 and 2002. 12 Figure 1 plots each country's average bilateral tari¤ equivalent with the other G7 countries, weighted by each trading partner's share of combined G7 exports.
As Figure 1 shows, all seven countries have experienced a steady decline in their average tari¤ equivalents. The decline is strongest for Canada, resulting in the lowest 2002 tari¤ equivalent (26:6 percent), and the decline is weakest for Japan, resulting in the highest 2002 tari¤ equivalent (55:3 percent). In a world of increased regional economic integration it is not surprising that the Japanese decline is the least pronounced, given that geographically Japan is most isolated from the other G7 countries. 13 The top graph in Figure 2 depicts the average of the graphs in 1 2 The G7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the U.S. 1 3 Japan is not only geographically the most isolated amongst the G7 countries. Japan does not share a common language, a colonial history nor a free trade agreement with any other G7 country, see Section 4. 
An Increase in Regional Economic Integration
Tables 1 and 2 exhibit the pattern that U.S. and UK bilateral trade costs have fallen most dramatically for nearby trading partners. In fact, this pattern applies more generally for the sample of 29 countries described in Section 2.4, suggesting that over the past few decades there has been an increase in regional economic integration. Table 3 formally demonstrates for a panel of 339 country pairs that regional integration has improved between 1970 and 2000. In a regression of the percentage decline in tari¤ equivalents, the coe¢ cient of the logarithm of distance is negative and signi…cant. This result holds up even if intra-European trade relations are not included in the sample. 16 In other words, although absolute trade ‡ows have increased for virtually all country pairs, relative trade ‡ows have been diverted towards nearby countries. Coughlin (2004) comes to the same conclusion from the perspective of individual U.S. states in an analysis of merchandise exports. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) …nd evidence of relative trade diversion in that the formation of the European Community lowered the growth in trade with other industrial countries by 1:7 percentage points. The results in Table 3 suggest that the diversion of relative trade to nearby countries did not only take place amongst and Paci…c Asia as continental trading blocs that have a high degree of internal integration.
As free trade agreements have typically been concluded with nearby countries, they have certainly contributed to the increase in regional economic integration, see Venables (2001) for a discussion. Another reason could be evidence reported by Hummels (1999) that over recent years the cost of overland transport has declined relative to ocean transport, which might have disproportionately favored shorter distances.
The Determinants of Trade Costs
Trade costs can vary substantially across country pairs. An obvious question to ask is which factors can explain this variation. For instance, why is the G7 average tari¤ equivalent so much lower for Canada (26:6 percent) than for Japan (55:3 percent)? A trade cost panel of 339 country pairs for the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 is used in an attempt to explain this variation. 17 The factors that have the potential to explain trade costs can be divided into three rough groups. The …rst group consists of geographical factors like distance between two trading partners and contiguity. Both distance and contiguity can be seen as proxies for transportation costs and information costs which tend to be lower for nearby trading partners.
The second group of potential determinants of trade costs is formed by historical factors. These include variables that capture whether two countries had a colonial rela-tionship in the past (e.g. the UK and Australia) and whether they share the same o¢ cial language. Countries that had a colonial relationship in the past often have strong historical trade linkages and countries with the same o¢ cial language might …nd it easier to communicate. Most of the variables just mentioned are common regressors in the gravity literature, for example in Rose (2000) and Fitzgerald (2005) . The variables are usually regarded ex ante as trade cost components and have therefore been directly included into gravity regressions. If such traditional gravity regressions are estimated with the present data set, the coe¢ cients fall squarely into the range typically suggested in the gravity literature.
One can therefore exclude the possibility that the results reported in the following are driven by peculiarities of the particular sample.
Baseline Results
Trade costs are linked to their determinants by the following baseline regression appendix explains the variables in more detail and gives the exact data sources.
Note that the dependent variable is the tari¤ equivalent jkt , not iceberg trade costs jkt . This choice renders the interpretation of the coe¢ cients more intuitive. In regression (24) the individual 's represent the percentage point changes in the tari¤ equivalent in response to marginal changes in the regressors. The choice of the tari¤ equivalent over iceberg trade costs leaves the statistical signi…cance of the regressors virtually una¤ected. 20 Table 4 reports the results of regression (24), both for pooled data and individual years. Exchange rate volatility in the panel increased markedly after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, explaining the positive and signi…cant coe¢ cients for 1980 and 1990, but decreased considerably during the 1990s. As Table 5 demonstrates, however, exchange rate volatility is no longer signi…cant once country …xed e¤ects are included.
Fixed E¤ects and Additional Regressors
It might be the case that the baseline results presented in Table 4 are driven by countryspeci…c characteristics that cannot be observed. In order to control for this possibility, country …xed e¤ects are included. Indeed, a likelihood ratio test overwhelmingly rejects the pooled baseline regression in favor of a …xed e¤ects speci…cation. The R 2 is also markedly enhanced by country …xed e¤ects. These results hint at a sizeable degree of heterogeneity across countries.
In addition, trade costs might also be determined by factors that so far have been omitted. I therefore augment baseline regression (24) Table 5 reports the results of the augmented …xed e¤ects regressions. The dependent variable is the tari¤ equivalent jkt . Robust OLS estimation, t-statistics given in parentheses. ** indicates signi…cance at the 1 percent level.
As in the baseline speci…cation of Table 4 the distance coe¢ cient is highly signi…cant and similar in magnitude over time, an observation which is consistent with the metaanalysis by Disdier and Head (2005) 
Discussion
The empirical results of Tables 4 and 5 are generally consistent with estimates reported in the literature. However, some special attention is warranted for the border and exchange rate volatility variables, the …xed e¤ects as well as the free trade agreement dummy.
In the pooled baseline regression of Table 4 the bene…cial e¤ect of sharing a common border is highly signi…cant. Being neighboring countries reduces the tari¤ equivalent by 15 percentage points. An interesting observation is that once country …xed e¤ects are taken into account in Table 5 , the contiguity e¤ect completely disappears. This …nding suggests that without …xed e¤ects a border dummy might erroneously pick up countryspeci…c characteristics. Similarly, exchange rate volatility is no longer signi…cant when …xed e¤ects are included, indicating that this variable, too, might otherwise erroneously pick up country-speci…c features. The same caution should be exercised when making inference about these regressors in traditional gravity equations. Indeed, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) point out the …xed e¤ects speci…cation as a consistent estimation method for gravity equations.
The country …xed e¤ects themselves carry important information. They are positive and signi…cant for Greece and Iceland but they are negative and signi…cant for Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.S. 23 It is di¢ cult to give a general explanation for these e¤ects because by construction they capture unobserved characteristics. But at least in the case of Greece the excessive level of trade costs might be related to poor data quality. 24 It might at …rst seem surprising that the e¤ects of free trade agreements are so limited.
Once country …xed e¤ects are included into the pooled regressions, the tari¤ equivalent drops by merely …ve percentage points when two countries conclude a free trade agreement. As mentioned earlier though, using lagged values bolsters the estimated magnitudes because the bene…cial e¤ects of free trade agreements need time to materialize. But in general, time series evidence suggests that the e¤ects of trade agreements are moderate.
For example, Head and Mayer (2000) are unable to associate the implementation of the 1986 Single European Act with a signi…cant drop in EU trade costs. In the same vein, Rose (2004) …nds that WTO membership does not lead to a signi…cant change of trade patterns.
A number of robustness checks have been performed for the results of Tables 4 and   5 . Computing trade costs based on an elasticity of substitution = 5 instead of = 11
leaves the signi…cance and signs of coe¢ cients virtually unchanged. Furthermore, the residuals of the trade cost regressions might be spatially correlated because if a certain country is hit by a shock, its neighbors are more likely a¤ected than remote countries. 2 3 It is not possible to include country random e¤ects instead of country …xed e¤ects because each observation is associated with two countries. The random e¤ects speci…cation becomes an option though for country-pair e¤ects. However, a Hausman test resoundingly rejects country-pair random e¤ects in favor of country-pair …xed e¤ects. When country-pair …xed e¤ects are included, the coe¢ cients reported in Table 5 for the institutional factors are virtually unchanged. But of course, country-pair …xed e¤ects absorb the time-invariant geographical and historical factors and are therefore less informative.
2 4 The Greek GDP …gures are extraordinarily high relative to trade ‡ows, resulting in high trade costs.
To check for this possibility, I regress the residuals on continental dummies but …nd only weak correlation for the regressions of Table 4 and no spatial correlation at all for the …xed e¤ects speci…cations of Table 5 . 25 In addition, trade cost regressions that allow for cluster e¤ects associated with individual countries or continents produce results very similar to those in Tables 4 and 5 Since within one country all …rms producing tradable goods are symmetric and all …rms producing nontradable goods are also symmetric, the index i will be dropped in the following.
A.1 Equilibrium of the Model
Each country-j consumer maximizes utility (1) subject to budget constraint (7), leading to the optimal labor supply condition
In order to solve the model it is useful to de…ne per-capita output, per-capita labor supply and per-capita pro…ts as
where y T j is the same as y T ji from (8), L T j is the same L T ji as from (11) and T j is the same as T ji from (14). The remaining right-hand side variables are the corresponding variables for nontradable …rm i. Using the production functions (9) and (10) as well as the price markups (15)- (17) it follows
Combined with budget constraint (7) and the optimal labor supply condition (25) this yields the optimal per-capita labor supply
Express nominal wages across countries as
where the 's are auxiliary parameters yet unknown. It follows from the price markups (15)- (17) that
Use (29) in price index (3) to derive
An expression for the real wage follows directly as
Using budget constraint (7) and the optimal labor supply condition (25), expressions for consumption and real pro…ts follow as
as well as
To solve for the 's in (30), start o¤ with (26) and plug in the market-clearing conditions (12) and (13). Then substitute in for prices and consumption using (15)- (17), (29), (31) and (34) to yield
From the production functions (9) and (10), de…nitions (26) and (27) and expression (32) it follows
It must therefore be the case that the curly brackets in (35) are equal to ! j as de…ned in (30). Setting the curly brackets equal to ! j and using (30) yields
Finally, plug (36) back into (30) to obtain
The system of polynomial equations represented by (37) for j = 1; 2;:::; J cannot be solved analytically. However, it can be established numerically by repeated substitution that a unique solution exists for the !'s for all combinations of admissible exogenous parameter values. The admissible parameter values are 0 < n k n k 1 < 1, 0 < s k 1, > 1, A k > 0 and 0 k;j < 1 for all j; k. The implicit function theorem can be applied to compute the partial e¤ects of changes in exogenous parameters on the !'s.
The !'s give rise to sensible general equilibrium e¤ects for the real wage, consumption and real pro…ts in equations (31)-(33). For example, a technology improvement in A j increases ! j and therefore the real wage, consumption and real pro…ts for country-j citizens but, to a smaller extent, it also increases the other !'s and is thus also bene…cial to foreign citizens.
A.2 A Gravity Equation with Trade Costs
In order to derive gravity equation (21), plug the market-clearing condition (12) into the right-hand side of (18) and use the country-j version of (29), (36) and the country-k versions of (31) and (32). Use production function (9) and rearrange to yield
Plug the left-hand side of (38) into the right-hand side of (37), noting that L j = L k from (28) and using (11) and (27) . Also note that
Plug the country-j and country-k versions of (39) back into the right-hand side of expression (18) and then rearrange to obtain
Finally, note that P OP j = (n j n j 1 ) and P OP k = (n k n k 1 ). Also note from (26) that GDP j = (n j n j 1 )y j and
and by de…nition (8)
The same applies to GDP k EXP k . Gravity equation (21) can now be obtained by plugging P OP j , P OP k , GDP j EXP j and GDP k EXP k into (40). The corresponding gravity equation for EXP k;j follows analogously.
Given the two single gravity equations for EXP j;k and EXP k;j , one can easily solve for j;k and k;j separately as in (22) and (23). In order to derive gravity equation (19),
solve (22) and (23) for (1 j;k ) and (1 k;j ) and multiply them by each other.
A.3 Imports and Trade Imbalances
All gravity equations in Section 2.3 are cast in exports but for completeness imports are mentioned here. The relationship between exports and imports is particularly simple, given by
where IM P j;k are real imports from j arriving in k. Although its simple form looks inviting, it is not recommended to compute trade costs on the basis of (41) due to inconsistencies of the export data (reported by country j) and import data (reported by country k). These inconsistencies of the IMF DOTS data come about through di¤erences in classi…cation concepts, time of recording, valuation and coverage of trade ‡ows across countries. See Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) for a discussion. Using relation (41) the import version of gravity equation (20) follows as
But since both import and export variables show up in this expression and given the data inconsistencies, the import version is not used to compute bilateral trade costs.
Many countries run trade de…cits or surpluses that are often persistent. Trade imbalances are therefore integrated into the model and it is shown that equation (20) remains una¤ected. The per-capita budget constraint (7) is generalized to
where T j;l are nominal per-capita transfers from country j to l. As an accounting identity it follows
For analytical convenience it is now assumed that per-capita transfers are a fraction of per-capita consumption spending T j;l = j;l P j C j with j;j = 0 for all j such that the budget constraint (42) can be rewritten as
If J P k=1 j;l > 0, then j is a creditor country and runs a trade surplus. The optimal labor supply condition (25) becomes
and consumption follows as
The markups (15)- (17), per-capita output (28), real wages (31) and real pro…ts (33) are not a¤ected. If j runs a surplus, this reduces per-capita consumption C j . Intuitively, due to logarithmic utility in (1), output L j is constant. If j transfers some of its produced wealth to other countries, then its consumption must fall.
Now use the notation
where CA j denotes the nominal current account of country j and CON S j denotes the nominal consumption of country j. The equations corresponding to (22) and (23) are
For example, suppose that initially both j and k have a balanced current account (CA j = CA k = 0). If all else being equal j now becomes a surplus country (CA j > 0), then j;k drops whereas k;j increases. Intuitively, country j would not run a surplus unless trade costs shifted into directions favorable for exports from j to k and disadvantageous for imports from k to j. But gravity equation (20) that make use of trade cost symmetry and from which empirical trade costs are computed is not a¤ected by introducing trade imbalances.
In order to understand the model's implications for bilateral trade imbalances, it is useful to look at the ratio V j;k of nominal exports between j and k
What matters for the ratio V j;k is whether the two countries each run a net total de…cit or a net total surplus. For example, even if j transfers money to k (T j;k > 0, which might seem like a surplus for j), it can still be the case that k is a net exporter to j (V j;k < 1).
A country therefore runs either a surplus or a de…cit against all its trading partners, regardless of the monetary ‡ows from individual trading partners. 
B.2 Explanatory Variables
The distance data represent great-circle distances between capital cities. They have been collected from the website http://www.indo.com/distance/.
The following variables are taken from Andrew Rose's (2000) data set, available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/: the border dummy, the colonial dummy, the language dummy, the free trade agreement dummy, the exchange rate volatility, the surface area variable, the landlocked variable and the island variable. The landlocked and island variables take on the value 1 if one of the trading partners is landlocked or an island and the value 2 if both partners are landlocked or islands. The surface area variable represents the logarithm of the product of surface areas for each country pair. Table 5 only, the tari¤, in ‡ation and capital control variables are multiplied by 100. Table A1 reports simple correlations between the variables used in the regressions. 
